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IL STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from Mr. Michael Alfaro's judgment of conviction and sentence for
aiding and abetting first degree murder, two counts of aiding and abetting aggravated assault,
aiding and abetting unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling and a sentence enhancement for
infliction of great bodily injury.

B.

Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings
1.

The Shooting and Investigation as Described During Trial

The summer of 2004, Harvey, his younger brother Sael and his friends Jason and Carlos
associated with the Westside gang in Caldwell, Idaho. Tr. Vol. VI p. 45, ln. 15 - p. 46, In. 3.
That summer there had been numerous exchanges of gunfire between Westside and a rival gang,
Eastside. Id. at p. 46, ln. 4-10; p. 47, ln. 15-21; p. 166, ln. 3-9; p. 227, ln. 7-11; p. 253, ln. 3-5; p.
412, In. 1 - p. 413, ln. 12. On August 8, 2004, Harvey's neighbor called police to report shots
fired and the investigating officer found two spent casings on the road in front of Harvey's house
and noticed two bullet holes that appeared to go from outside to inside at the front of Harvey's
house. Id. at p. 464, In. 7 - p. 465, In. 35; see also p. 412, ln. 1-22. One neighbor testified there
were so many drive-by shootings in Harvey's neighborhood that summer, her children were
afraid to sleep on the side of the house facing the street. See id. at p. 699, In. 22-25; p. 703, In.
20 - 704, In. 3. Another neighbor recalled three shootings at Harvey's residence during the
month of August alone. Id. at p. 709, In. 6-23.
On August 14, 2004, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Harvey, Sae!, Carlos and Jason were at
Harvey's house when Carlos was fatally wounded by a gun shot wound to the neck. This shooting

was the third that police had investigated in Caldwell that night alone. Id. at p. 349, In. 2-6.
Carlos - who medics found laying inside in a pool of blood

was taken from the house out the

front door and placed in an ambulance. Id. at p. 353, In. 1-5; p. 428, In. 4-10. An officer
investigating the scene noticed a large spot of coagulated blood that he found strange because it
was located a few feet away from where he observed the medics carry Carlos. Id. at p. 349, In. 23
- p. 350, In. 7; p. 354, In. 9-13. The bullet that killed Carlos could not be tied to a particular
weapon and was possibly a hollow point or soft point, copper jacketed bullet and was either .09
millimeter, .357, or .38 special in diameter. Id. at p. 487, ln. 14-28. Officers at the scene
recovered .380 casings in the area somewhat surrounding the driveway and .40 casings were
everywhere. Id. at p. 324, ln. 14-21; p. 324, ln. 22-25. One neighbor reported seeing a blue car
speed away after the shooting and another described a light-colored tan sedan with three people in
it. Id. at p. 701, ln. 2 - p. 702, In. 8; p. 709, ln. 20 - p. 711, ln. 8.
Harvey told a responding police officer that he had arrived at the house a few moments
before a vehicle drove by and shot at his house. See id. at p. 325, ln. 21-25. Harvey told the
officer that at the time of the shooting, he had been sitting in vehicle parked in the driveway, that
Jason and Sael sat in folding chairs in front of the garage and that Carlos had gone inside to get
something to eat. Id. at p. 325, In. 25 - p. 326, In. 7. One officer noticed that Jason had a small
bump above his left eye and small bleeding cut but Jason refused to describe how he was
wounded. Id. at p. 476, ln. 17-25. Another officer asked Harvey the make, model and color of
vehicle that shot at him and Harvey could not describe the type of vehicle that shot at him. Id. at
p. 327, In. 8-15. Harvey informed the officer that the car he had been sitting in was no longer at
the home, denied returning fire and along with Jason and Sae!, was generally uncooperative with
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law enforcement's efforts to investigate the shooting of their friend. Id. at p. 326, In. 10-11; p.
327, In. 18 - p. 328, In. 4.
Police interviewed over a hundred people in relation to Carlos' death yet never recovered
a weapon, never found a vehicle involved in the shooting and had no suspects. Id. at p. 399, In.
20-23; p. 413, In. 18-22; p. 415, In. 1-11. Police had information that somebody had left Harvey's
residence after the shooting and had returned fire while Harvey and the other Westsiders denied
anyone leaving the residence and denied returning fire. Id. at p. 393, In. 1-6; p. 409, In. 7-18.
On August 23, 2004, an officer questioned Eastsider Mario about a drive-by shooting near
his house that occurred on August 14, 2004, at 12:30 in the morning - approximately three hours
before Carlos was shot. See id. at p. 657, In. 20 - p. 659, In. 8. Mario described hearing four shots
as he observed a car drive by a neighbor and fellow Eastsider's house. Id. at p. 659, In. 12 - 19.
The car then continued down the street towards Mario's house, slowed down and fired a shot
close enough that he felt the bullet go by his leg. Id. at p. 659, ln. 20 - p. 660, In. 5. In September
of 2004, Mario was asked to identify anyone involved in the shooting that killed Carlos and he
would not do so. Id. at p. 630, ln. 6 - p. 631, ln. 3; p. 632, In. 16 - p. 634, In. 12.
In June of 2005, the uncle of a young Eastsider named Evan was having trouble with the
Caldwell Police Department and brought Evan in to provide information to shift attention away
from himself. Id. at p. 170, In. 23 - p. 171, In. 3; p. 194, In. 6-25; p. 400, In. 14-18. Evan claimed
to be in the vehicle - a light blue four door

involved in the drive-by shooting that claimed

Carlos' life. Evan said he was with another Eastsider named Arandu, an individual named
Richard, and a person he knew only as "Mike" who was driving. Id. at p. 384, In. 12-15; p. 384,
In. 22 - p. 385, In. 6; p. 410, In. 20-25; p. 416, In. 12-16. Evan told police that they drove around

for a bit and then drove by a residence at which Richard, the front passenger, and Arandu, the rear
passenger, opened fire. Id. at p. 390, In. 6-11. Evan dove towards the floor of the vehicle until
the vehicle stopped at a Flying J where they changed a flat tire presumably hit by gunfire from the
residence. Id. at p. 391, In. 3-24.
Evan was shown a six person photo line-up in which Mr. Alfaro was pictured as number
three and Evan indicated the driver "Mike" was either two or three. Id. at p. 388, In. 1-1 0; 654,
ln. 9 - p. 655, In. 7. Although he claimed to have been sober during the event, Evan could not
identify the time of year he had been in the car or the time of day, other than to say it was dark.
Id. at p. 401, ln. 21-25; p. 402, ln. 1-4; p. 403, ln. 8-11; p. 405, ln. 21-25. Police provided Evan

with the location of Harvey's house and asked whether it was the location of the shooting, which
Evan affirmed. Id. at p. 385, ln. 21-23. After Evan's interview, Richard denied being involved in
the shooting. Id. at p. 601, ln. 6 - p. 602, ln. 7. Richard indicated that he heard about the shooting
from Mario, that he was not in the vehicle during the shooting, and would be willing to take a
polygraph. Id. at p. 602, ln. 18-23; p. 602, ln. 24 - p. 603, In. 5.
In June of 2009, Mario was charged with multiple felonies including recruiting gang
members, supplying fireanns and witness intimidation. Id. at p. 258, ln. 7-14; p. 635, ln. 6-12.
Following Mario's arrest, law enforcement questioned Mario regarding their belief that he knew
something about Carlos' death in August of 2004. Id. at p. 636, ln. 9-15. Having had a falling out
with the Eastside gang and wanting to get benefit of plea bargain, Mario decided to tell law
enforcement that he observed Arandu and Evan getting into a black Cadillac with Mike and
Richard the night of August 14, 2004. Id. at p. 229, In. 24 - p. 229, ln. 2; p. 256, ln. 1-6; p. 230,
In. 15-23; p. 259, ln. 1-1 0; p. 636, In. 16-22. In exchange for his cooperation, all charges against
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Mario were dismissed. Id. at p. 259, In. 11-14.
2.

Pre-Trial Procedural History

On August 6, 2009, the grand jury returned an Indictment charging Mr. Alfaro with
involuntary manslaughter, two counts of aiding and abetting aggravated assault and aiding and
abetting the unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling. R. Vol. Ip. 6-7. The Indictment
alleged that Mr. Alfaro was driving the vehicle which shot at Javier's house and caused Carlos'
death. Id. A second part of the Indictment alleged that Mr. Alfaro inflicted or aided and abetted
others in inflicting great bodily injury on Carlos, that the injury was either intended or that the act
causing the injury was done with reckless disregard for another's safety and occurred during the
commission or attempted commission of a felony. R. Vol. I p. 10-11.
Mr. Alfaro was arrested and initially appeared on the Indictment on January 11, 2010. R.
Vol. Ip. 2. At a status conference, the State indicated that it had subsequently indicted Mr. Alfaro
with first degree murder, which was proceeding in a separate case. R. 42. Ultimately, the two
cases were consolidated without objection from Mr. Alfaro. R. Vol. Ip. 49. After the district
court denied Mr. Alfaro's motion to dismiss the indictments for insufficient evidence, Mr.
Alfaro's attorney consented to the filing of a consolidated indictment. R. Vol. Ip. 78, 81-86.
The Amended Indictment charged Mr. Alfaro with aiding and abetting first degree murder or,
alternatively, involuntary manslaughter; two counts of aggravated assault and aiding and abetting
unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling. Id. at p. 92. A second part again charged Mr.
Alfaro with inflicting bodily injury. Id. at p. 93.
3.

Eastside and Westside Testimony at Trial

A five day jury trial commenced on October 12, 2010 - more than six years after the
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shooting. Evan testified that he was about thirteen years old on August 14, 2004 and associated
with Eastsiders. Tr. Vol. VI p. 148, In. 12 - p. 149, In. 5. Evan testified that on August 14, 2004,
he and Arandu arrived at Mario's house as it was getting dark and they hung out drinking beer and
smoking marijuana. Id. at p. 149, In. 6-21; p. 152, In. 20 - p. 153, In. 7; p. 171, In. 8-10. Evan
could not say how much he had been drinking but admitted to smoking marijuana on a daily basis.

Id. at p. 176, In. 1-19. Evan claimed that Richard arrived at Mario's in a car with Mike driving.
Id. at p. 153, In. 22 - p. 153, In. 6; p. 177, In. 11-14; p. 184, In. 23 - p. 185, In. 2. Evan was unable
to explain how he knew Mike, whether he had met him before that night or ifhe had actually met
or seen Mike or Richard prior to that night. Id. at p. 161, In. 11-13; p. 178, In. 1-7. Evan thought
he had seen Mike and Richard around "once," thought perhaps they were friends with his brother
and could not explain why he believed they were Eastisders. Id. at p. 161, In. 14-19; p. 183, In. 921. The evidence at trial established that the photograph Evan had identified as "Richard" during
grand jury proceedings was actually a photograph of Richard's brother, Robert. Id. at p. 175, In.
3-9; p. 599, In. 14 - p. 600, In. 15.
Evan testified that he got into the car behind the driver and that Arandu rode in the
backseat behind the front seat passenger, Richard. Id. at p. 154, In. 11 - p. 155, In. 4. They drove
around for a little bit and then he noticed they were in Westside territory where they drove past a
house that he did not recognize with two people standing in the front yard. Id. at p. 155, In. 2225; p. 156, In. 20; p. 179, In. 1-13; p. 214, In. 13 - p. 215, In. 1. Evan testified that the car turned
around, headed back to the house and then Arandu and Richard opened fire. Id. at p. 156, In. 1-5.
According to Mario's trial testimony, he was having a party the evening of August 14,
2004 and Evan and Arandu arrived at approximately 9:00 or 10:00 p.m as it was getting dark. Id.
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at p. 223, In. 5-15; p. 241, In. 18-20; p. 242, In. 4-16. About an hour later, Mike and Richard
arrived with Mike driving a two door black Monte Carlo. Id. at p. 223, In. 19 - p. 224, In. 13; p.
225, In. 8-22; p. 243, In. 2-8; p. 246, In. 9-25. After Mike and Arandu talked, Arandu and Evan
got into the car. Id. at p. 226, In. 6-25. Ten to thirty minutes after Evan and Arandu left, Mario
heard gun shots. Id. at p. 227 In. 15-21; p. 244, In. 15-21. When asked about the shooting on
August 14 at 12:35 a.m. in which Mario told police he felt a bullet go by his leg, Mario testified it
was different night than the night Mike and Richard picked Arandu and Evan up at his house. Id.
at p. 260, In. 2 to 261, In. 7.
Richard was transported as a witness from a federal prison where he was serving time for
distribution of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 566, In. 13-24. Richard entered a binding plea
agreement the evening before his testimony in which he agreed to plead guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and to testify against Mr. Alfaro in exchange for a sentence of six years fixed and
fifteen years indeterminite, to run concurrently with his federal sentence with credit beginning
approximately two months earlier. See Exhibit 76.
Richard testified that the evening of August 13, he met up with Mr. Alfaro, had some
beers and talked about Richard's house getting shot at by Westsiders. Id. at p. 567, ln. 6-14; p.
568, In. 6-13. Richard testified that they went to Mario's with Mike driving a four door sedan,
picked up Arandu and Evan and drove around for twenty or thirty minutes. Id. at p. 569, In. 6-25;
p. 572, In. 1-3; p. 597, In. 21-23. Richard testified that he had a Glock .40 and that Arandu had a
gun but he did not know what kind. Id. at p. 571, In. 15-23. They drove to Harvey's house,
noticed two people outside, and Mike turned off the headlights. Id. at p. 572, In. 4 - p. 573, In. 9.
Richard heard gunfire, got out his gun, started shooting and emptied a clip at the house. Id. at p.
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573, In. 10-13; p. 575, In. 16-23. Unlike Evan, Richard indicated that the car did not drive by
once and tum around before the exchange of fire. Id. at p. 590, In. 9-15. Richard testified that
they went to the Flying J to fix a flat tire, that a girlfriend picked he, Arandu and Evan up and that
they just left "Mario there - I mean Mike there." Id. at p. 577, In. 19-22.
Harvey testified that the early morning hours of August 14, 2004, he was home with Sael,
Jason and Carlos drinking beer. Id. at p. 29, ln. 1 - p. 31, ln. 4; p. 32, In. 5 - p. 33 ln. 3; p. 63, ln.
13-19. According to Harvey, he, Sael and Jason were outside while Carlos was in the kitchen. Id.
at p. 34, ln. 6-10. Harvey testified that a white car drove by his house several times at a high rate
of speed, which caught his attention. Id. at p. 32, ln. 22-23; p. 33, ln. 4-6; p. 54, ln. 20 - p. 55, ln.
17. Shortly thereafter, another darker car drove down the street with its lights out going slow
enough that it could have easily come to a stop. Id. at p. 33, ln. 8-21; p. 89, ln. 17-25; p. 92, ln.
19-25. Somehow Harvey came to have a gun in his hand (he denied having the firearm before the
shooting, testified he did not know where it came from or what happened to it after the shooting)
and he started shooting when he heard gunshots coming from the car. Id. at p. 34, ln. 13-25; p.
61, ln. 25 -p. 62, ln. l; p. 64, In. 1-24; p. 78, ln. 10-21; p. 79, ln. 18-21; p. 94, ln. 6-18; p. 96, In.
1-8. He then heard a moan from inside the house and ran inside to find Carlos shot in the neck.
Sael also testified that he was at Harvey's house with Jason and Carlos on August 14,
2004. Id. at p. 109, ln. 4-9. Sael did not see the white car testified to by Harvey. See id. at p. 124,
ln. 20-22. Instead, Sael testified that he saw a car drive down the street, turn around and drive
back towards his house. Unlike the car Harvey observed, this car was traveling fast for a
neighborhood and Sael did not recall the head lights being off. Id. at p. 110, ln. 7 - p. 111, In. 12;
p. 124, ln. 1-9; p. 125, In. 5-23. Sael got down and covered his head during the shooting. Id. at p.
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111, In. 15 - p. 112, In. 4; p. 115, ln. 2-10.
4.

Closing Argument and Post-Trial Proceedings

During closing argument, Mr. Alfaro noted the inconsistencies among the testimony of the
different witnesses, the inconsistencies of the statements by the same witnesses over time, and the
lack of physical evidence linking the drive-by shooting described to the Eastsiders as the same one
in which Carlos was shot. See generally id. at p. 781, ln. 17 - p. 823, In. 6. In rebuttal, the State
argued that in Mr. Alfaro' s closing argument, he contested the details of Carlos' shooting despite
characterizing the only issue as being whether Mike was the driver. Id. at p. 823, In. 12-23. Mr.
Alfaro objected to the State's characterization to which the prosecutor responded "we just went on
an hour-long red herring fishing trip." Id. at p. 824, In. 2-3. Mr. Alfaro replied "same objection,
Judge" and the district court ruled that Mr. Alfaro was "allowed a continuing objection." Id. at p.
824, In. 3-6.
The jury found Mr. Alfaro guilty of aiding and abetting first degree murder, both counts of
aggravated assault, and aiding and abetting unlawful discharge of a firearm at an inhabited
dwelling. Id. at p. 846, In. 11 - p. 847, In. 7. Mr. Alfaro filed a motion for a judgment of
acquittal, which the district court denied. R. Vol. Ip. 146-53. The district court sentenced Mr.
Alfaro to a unified term of life with a minimum period of confinement of twenty years for the
murder conviction and concurrent fixed terms of five years for the two counts of aggravated
assault and discharging a firearm. Id. at 162. This appeal follows.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the prosecutor's misconduct in closing argument deprive Mr. Alfaro of his

right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
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B.

Was there constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the verdict?

C.

Did the combination of errors and irregularities deprive Mr. Alfaro of his due

process right to a fair trial?
D.

Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. Alfaro's right to trial and

due process by sentencing him more harshly for exercising his right to trial?
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Violated Mr. Alfaro's Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial
A prosecutor exceeds the scope of permissible argument if he or she attempts to secure a

verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227,245 P.3d 961,979 (2010); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86,
156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). Prosecutorial misconduct followed by a contemporaneous
objection is reviewed for harmless error. State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269,271,270 P.3d
1054, 1056 (Ct. App. 2011).
Thus, this Court must first determine whether the prosecutorial conduct was improper and,
second, consider whether such misconduct prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. An
error is ham1less if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the verdict. Perry, 150 Idaho at 219-20, 245 P.3d at 971-72; Marmentini,
152 Idaho at 271, 270 P.3d at 1056. Prosecutorial misconduct constitutes a due process violation
when it is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Greer v..Miller, 483 U.S. 756,
765-66 (1987); Marmentini, 152 Idaho at 271-72, 270 P.3d at 1056-57. Whether the trial court

10

sustains an objection to an impermissible question, or whether the prosecutor is allowed to refer to
impermissible information in his or her closing arguments, are questions that are relevant to the
harmless-error inquiry, or to deciding whether the error made the trial fundamentally unfair.

Marmentini, 152 Idaho at 272,270 P.3d at 1057.
It is misconduct to disparage defense counsel's argument. State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15,
19, 189 P.3d 4 77, 481 (Ct. App. 2008). Here, the prosecutor disparaged defense counsel's entire
closing argument by referring to it as "an hour-long red herring fishing trip." Tr. Vol. VI p. 824,
In. 2-3. A "red herring" is commonly understood to be a clue which is misleading or distracting
from the actual issue. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red herring as visited November 8, 2012.
By characterizing defense counsel's closing argument in its entirety as misleading and distracting
from the truth, the prosecutor went beyond asking the jury to return a verdict based on evidence,
instructions and permissible inferences. The prosecutor's argument instead ridiculed Mr. Alfaro's
entire defense and deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
Mr. Alfaro acknowledges that in State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 189, 254 P.3d 77, 90 (Ct.
App. 2011) the Court held that the prosecutor's rebuttal argument referring to some of defense
counsel's arguments as red herrings and smoke and mirrors, to which no objection was made, was
not misconduct. Norton should be limited to its specific facts and does not control here.
Initially, a prosecutor's statements that suggest that defense counsel is trying to distract the
jury from the truth are improper. People v. Unger, 749 N.W.2d 272, 294 (Mich. App. 2008).
Conversely, the use of the term "red herring" with respect to specific defense arguments is not
necessarily unfair when the reviewing court can reasonably characterize those arguments as
peripheral, inconclusive or unimportant. See State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092, 1127 (Conn.
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2008); see also Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d 90 (noting the prosecutor disparaged defense
theories rather than defense counsel). The prosecution clearly exceeds the bounds of proper
argument by suggesting that defense counsel attempted to confuse and mislead the jury by using
"red herrings." See Unger, 749 N.W.2d at 294.
By referring to Mr. Alfaro's entire closing argument as an hour-long red herring fishing
trip, the prosecutor conveyed that defense counsel's argument was nothing other than an attempt
to distract the jury away from the truth. Such a statement can be distinguished from a reference in
closing argument to one or more specific defense theories as a distraction. C/Tr. Vol. VI p. 826,
In. 7-8 (specific reference to argument concerning the oddly placed pool of blood as a "fishing
trip). The prosecutor instead encouraged the jury to reject the entire defense as an attempt to
distract the jury from the real issues rather than provide specific reasons that the jury should reject
particular theories or arguments.
Nor can the entirety of defense counsel's arguments be discounted as peripheral or
inconclusive such that the characterization of the entire argument as a red herring can be
considered fair. Counsel's argument addressed serious issues with credibility among all of the
State's witnesses, Eastsiders and Westsiders alike. The defense also highlighted inconsistencies
that raised serious questions regarding whether the shooting described by the Eastsiders was the
same one in which Carlos was killed, whether Carlos was killed by friendly fire and whether Mr.
Alfaro was the "Mike" driving the vehicle. Before characterizing the entire defense argument as a
red herring, the prosecutor described defense counsel's argument as nothing more than contesting
"the shooting of Carlos," despite the defense's indication they did not contest that fact. Tr. Vol.
VI p. 823, In. 12-23. However, the defense's arguments that Mr. Alfaro was not involved in the
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shooting and that there were too many inconsistencies to link him to Carlos' death beyond a
reasonable doubt are a far cry from disputing that Carlos was killed by gunfire.
The prosecutor's characterization of the defense's entire closing argument as a red herring
was unfair and led the jury to believe that defense counsel was attempting to deceive them.
Although Mr. Alfaro objected, the district court did not expressly rule on the objection or instruct
the jury that it was improper to disparage Mr. Alfaro' s defense. Moreover, the argument
discouraged the jury from duly considering the numerous problems with the State's evidence,
which were addressed during the course of Mr. Alfaro's argument, and this Comi cannot say that
the impermissible argument did not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
the prosecutorial misconduct deprived Mr. Alfaro of his right to a fair trial and his judgment of
conviction must be vacated.

B.

There Was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Verdict
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction except

upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which a
defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In short, Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element
of the offense.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). In the case where a properly instructed jury has
convicted even though no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
that conviction cannot constitutionally stand. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318.
While Mr. Alfaro made an I.C.R. 29 motion at the close of the State's case and filed a
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motion for judgment of acquittal following trial, a criminal defendant need not even move for a
judgment of acquittal in order to preserve for appeal the issue of whether there was sufficient
evidence before the jury to support a guilty verdict. Slate v. Faught, 127 ldaho 873,877,908 P.2d
566,570 (1995); State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694,696,889 P.2d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 1994). Upon
appellate review, this Court must determine, based upon its independent consideration of the
evidence, whether there was substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict. State v.

Hollon, 136 Idaho 499,501, 36 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001). Put in constitutional terms:
"[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that at some point in time, Mr. Alfaro drove a vehicle carrying Richard,
Evan and Arandu into Westside territory and that Arandu and Richard exchanged fire with two
persons at Harvey's residence. However, given the undisputed testimony concerning the number
of drive-by shootings during that time period, along with inconsistencies in the witnesses'
testimony, there was not sufficient evidence to tie that event to the death of Carlos beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Carlos was shot at approximately 3:30 in the morning on August 14, 2004. While Harvey
testified that the vehicle that shot at his house only drove by one time and did not tum around,
Sae! testified that the vehicle drove by once and then returned. Harvey remembers the lights being
turned off whereas Sae! did not. Sael said the car was going fast while Harvey said it was going
slow. Evidence such as shells and bullets at the scene suggest one firearm shot at the residence
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while another firearm shot from the residence. Nothing in the Westsiders' testimony or the
evidence collected from Harvey's house is specific enough to link the event described by the
Eastsiders to the drive-by in which Carlos was killed.
Mario's testimony establishes that he observed Evan and Arandu get into a vehicle on an
entirely different evening than the night Carlos was killed. Police investigated a drive-by shooting
near Mario's in which a bullet passed by Mario's leg that occurred approximately three and one
half hours before Carlos was shot during. Mario testified that this drive-by shooting occurred on a
different night than the night Mike and Richard picked up Arandu and Evan. Id. at p. 260, In. 2 to
261, In. 7. Additionally, Mario testified that Evan and Arandu arrived after it was fairly dark,
around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. and that they left with Mike and Richard about an hour later. This time
line in conjunction with Richard and Evan's testimony that they drove around for a short period of
time before heading to Harvey's house does not place the vehicle at Harvey's at 3:30 in the
morning, four to five hours after they left Mario's. Even Mario's specific testimony regarding the
date this occurred did not help establish that the event occurred the same date Carlos was shot
Mario testified he had a party at his house attended by Evan and Arandu the evening of August
14, 2004. For Evan and Mario to have been picked up as described the evening before the
shooting, the party would have had to occur on August 13, not August 14.
Although Evan testified about an event on "August 14" it is apparent that his testimony
concerning the date was not based on personal knowledge. Instead, construing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, Evan had no idea when he was in a car with Mike,
Richard and Arandu and could not even tie the event to a particular time of year. Further, both he
and Richard testified to driving by a house in Westside territory with two, not three people
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standing outside and the time line established by Richard, Evan and Mario would have placed the
vehicle at Harvey's at approximately I :00 in the morning, not 3:30. Although Richard testified
that he and Mike picked up Evan and Arandu the evening of August 13, 2004, there was no
foundation or basis for his belief that the six year old event occmTed on that particular date.
Rather, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Richard's testimony
related to the same event described by Mario and Evan.
The various inconsistencies and absence of substantial evidence tying the event described
by the Eastsiders to Carlos' death might not have resulted in constitutionally insufficient evidence
but for the undisputed testimony that Caldwell was essentially a gang war zone during that time
frame. It was undisputed that there were many, many drive-by shootings that summer, that three
such shootings were reported at Harvey's house in the month of August alone and there were three
shootings reported the night Carlos was killed. It is inescapable that not every drive-by shooting
was reported to police. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Mike drove a car in
which passengers shot at Harvey's house some time around midnight, not at 3:30 a.m. Thus,
substantial evidence that Mike, Richard, Evan and Arandu were together during one drive-by at
Harvey's house - even if it could be reasonably concluded that the event occurred on August 14 was insufficient to link that drive-by to the one that killed Carlos beyond a reasonable doubt.
Constitutionally insufficient evidence was presented to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Alfaro participated in the drive-by shooting that claimed Carlos' life. Accordingly, his
judgment of conviction must be vacated.
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C.

The District Court Abused its Discretion and Violated Mr. Alfaro's Constitutional
Rights to a Jury Trial and Due Process by Sentencing Him More Harshly Based on
His Exercise of His Right to Trial

It is improper for a court to penalize a defendant merely because he or she exercises the
right to put the government to its proof at trial. Stedtfeld v. State, 114 Idaho 273, 276, 755 P.2d
1311, 1314 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 157, 730 P.2d 1069, 1077 (Ct.
App. 1986). And because the defendant retains the right to appeal a judgment of conviction, a
court may not coerce a defendant into sacrificing that right by threatening a more severe sentence
if the defendant does not abandon his or her assertion of innocence. State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho
812,814,229 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Ct. App. 2010). A court may properly consider a defendant's
refusal to acknowledge guilt when evaluating the defendant's rehabilitation potential because
acknowledgment of guilt is a critical first step toward rehabilitation. Id.
The district court sentenced Mr. Alfaro to twenty years to life for driving the vehicle in
which Richard fired a weapon at Harvey's residence and for which Richard would be sentenced to
a unified term of fifteen years with a minimum period of confinement of six years. Tr. Vol. VI §
7, p. 30, In. 17-25; p. 56, ln. 7-12. Unlike Arandu and Evan's relative youth to Mr. Alfaro and
Richard, no factor makes Richard less culpable than Mr. Alfaro. Indeed, given that Richard
actually fired a gun in retaliation for W estsiders shooting at his house, he is arguably more
culpable than Mr. Alfaro not less. Thus, the sole distinction between Mr. Alfaro and Richard is
that Richard elected to testify against Mr. Alfaro and plead guilty.
The district court also opined that the plea bargained sentences of Richard and others did
not serve justice but that the State was forced into those agreements because Mr. Alfaro exercised
his right to a jury trial. See id. at 54, In. 22 - p. 55, ln. 2. The district court recongized the
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anomaly in sentencing Mr. Alfaro more harshly than Richard and justified the disparate treatment
with the following:
There needs to be a message sent out to these small groups of individuals that live
in our community that we cannot allow this to happen. We're sick and tired of it.
And the rest of us that live law-abiding lives in this community cannot be living in
fear of this trash that has no regard for human life. It makes no sense.
Id. at p. 55, In. 14-20. While general deterrence is a legitimate aim of sentencing, it did not justify

the disparate treatment of Richard and Mr. Alfaro. Nor was the district court's conclusion that
Mr. Alfaro is "trash" a legitimate sentencing consideration, particularly when the lawless behavior
the district court sought to deter was equally engaged in by perpetrator and victims alike. See e.g.
Tr. Vol. VI p. 46, In. 4-10; p. 166, In. 3-9; p. 227, In. 7-11; p. 47, ln. 15-21; p. 412, ln. 1-22. The
district court also commented that it was unfair that it took many years to uncover the crime. Id.
at p. 54, ln. 19-21. However, it is undisputed that the Westsiders refused to cooperate in the
investigation for at least five years and it would be markedly unfair to assign the blame for the
delay in the investigation to Mr. Alfaro.
Moreover, the district court did not tie its harsher sentencing of Mr. Alfaro to the only
legitimate reason for treating a defendant who puts the State to its proof differently than a
defendant who accepts a plea bargain - potential for rehabilitation. In essence, the district court
was frustrated that Mr. Alfaro' s co-defendants received too little prison time as a result of Mr.
Alfaro's exercise of his right to trial and took that frustration out in sentencing Mr. Alfaro. See

Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815,229 P.3d at 1177
The district court sentenced Mr. Alfaro more harshly than other more culpable parties
because he exercised his right to trial. This disparate treatment and the district court's sentencing
was an abuse of discretion and violated Mr. Alfaro's right to a jury trial and due process and his
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sentence should be reversed.
D.

The Doctrine of Cumulative Error Demonstrates That Mr. Alfaro Was Denied His
Due Process Right to a Fair Trial
The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is an

accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated,
the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right
to due process. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73, 165 P.3d 273, 286-87 (2007). Here, the
errors discussed above cumulatively deprived Mr. Alfaro of his due process right to a fair trial,
even if those errors were harmless when considered individually.
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Alfaro respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
sentences.
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